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I.  Introduction 
 
High wage differences across countries constitute an important explanation for the 
currently significant business practice of international outsourcing. These wage 
differentials could lead to outsourcing (see e.g. Sinn (2007) for details, and Stefanova 
(2006) concerning the East-West dichotomy of outsourcing). Glass and Saggi (2001) 
have studied the causes of outsourcing and its effects and they found that higher 
international outsourcing lowers the relative wage of domestic workers compared with 
foreign workers, while it increases the profits and thereby creates greater incentives for 
innovation. We are not aware of any existing study, which would have studied 
theoretically the employment consequences of international outsourcing with unionized 
labor markets.
1 We analyze the effects of international outsourcing to low-wage 
countries and the effects of labor taxation on equilibrium unemployment of low-skilled 
workers and labor demand. Our analysis applies to high-wage countries characterized 
by heterogenous in-house workers in the dual labor markets when there is both 
unionized and competitive determination of wages.  
We show that both the own wage elasticity, the cross wage elasticity and the 
outsourcing elasticity for the low-skilled labor demand depend positively on the amount 
of outsourcing, and these wage elasticities also depend positively on the payroll tax, 
whereas the own wage elasticity, the cross wage elasticity and the outsourcing elasticity 
for the high-skilled labor demand are independent of the amount of outsourcing. In the 
presence of outsourcing the high-skilled wage formation depends negatively on the 
low-skilled wage and the payroll tax, whereas the high-skilled wage is independent of 
the high-skilled wage tax parameters under Cobb-Douglas utility function. In terms of 
low-skilled wage determination a higher share of outsourced production and a higher 
productivity of outsourced production will decrease the wage for the low-skilled labor 
                                                 
1   There are some papers that analyze the effects of outsourcing when labor is heterogeneous, like 
Davidson et al. (2007) and Davidson et al. (forthcoming). However, these papers analyze labor market 
frictions that arise with search, while we focus on the role of labor unions. Importantly, the effects of 
taxation on unemployment may differ even qualitatively between models with labor unions and with 
search-related unemployment. If wages are determined competitively or as in the shirking efficiency 
wage model, the structure of taxation is irrelevant to the impact of the tax cut (see e.g. Pissarides 
(1998)). But if wages are determined by a bargain also in search models, changes in the structure of 
taxation have large impacts on employment, which has been shown in Pissarides (1998).   3
and increase the wage for the high-skilled labor, thereby inducing higher wage 
dispersion. A higher low-skilled wage tax will increase the wage for the low-skilled 
labor, decrease the wage of high-skilled labor and a higher low-skilled wage tax 
exemption will decrease the wage for the low-skilled labor and increase the wage for 
the high-skilled labor, while a higher payroll tax for the firms will decrease the wage 
for the low-skilled labor and also decrease the wage for the high-skilled labor.   
In terms of optimal committed outsourcing policy parameters affect as follows: a 
higher domestic low-skilled wage tax and a higher unemployment benefit increase 
optimal outsourcing, while a higher tax exemption, ceteris paribus, decreases optimal 
outsourcing, and a higher payroll tax for the firms will have an ambiguous effect on 
optimal outsourcing.    
Finally, in terms of the effects of outsourcing and some policy variables on 
equilibrium unemployment of low-skilled workers we have the following result if 
benefit-replacement ratio is constant for the unemployed: A higher amount of 
outsourced production will reduce equilibrium unemployment of low-skilled workers 
both in the absence and presence of progressive wage taxation and proportional payroll 
taxation.   
In the presence of outsourcing the higher wage tax, the higher tax exemption and 
the higher payroll tax will have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium unemployment, 
when the benefit-replacement ratio is fixed and less than one. In the absence of 
outsourcing the higher wage tax will have a positive and the higher tax exemption will 
have a negative effect on equilibrium unemployment, while the higher payroll tax will 
have no effect. In the presence of outsourcing increasing the degree of tax progression 
by keeping the relative tax burden per worker constant by raising the wage tax and the 
tax exemption will decrease the wage rate and increase the labor demand of low-skilled 
workers. This result is qualitatively similar in the absence of outsourcing. 
We proceed as follows. Section II presents the time sequence of the decisions 
regarding some policy issues associated with labor taxes, outsourcing, wage setting for 
low-skilled workers and labor demand for high-skilled and low-skilled workers and the 
wage setting for high-skilled workers. We study the segmented labor demand for 
heterogenous labor force and wage formation of high-skilled workers due to market  4
equilibrium under labor taxation in section III. The wage formation by the monopoly 
labor union for low-skilled workers under linearly progressive wage tax, levied on 
workers, and proportional payroll tax, levied on firms, is analyzed in section IV. 
Section V explores how the optimal committed production mode from the firms’ point 
of view in the presence of partly imperfectly competitive and segmented labor market 
depends on various important policy variables. In section VI we explore some policy 
issues concerning equilibrium unemployment and labor demand of low-skilled 
domestic workers. Finally, we summarize conclusions in section VII.     
 
  
II.  The Basic Framework 
 
We analyze a model with heterogeneous workers and international outsourcing. 
The production combines labor services by high-skilled workers and low-skilled 
workers. Low-skilled labor services can be provided either by the firm’s own workers, 
or obtained from abroad through international outsourcing. 
Establishing international outsourcing is time-consuming, and reversing such 
decisions is often costly. Therefore, we assume that the firms have to commit to 
outsourcing before they hire domestic labor. Whether the firms or the government 
moves first, is an open question, a priori. We assume that the government decides on 
taxation and unemployment benefits before the firms decide on their international 
outsourcing. There are two motivations for this. First of all, major overhauls of tax 
systems are rather rare, and thus tax systems appear more stable than outsourcing 
decisions by individual firms. Second, the tax parameters to which we assume the 
government to commit could be viewed as an equilibrium outcome of a repeated game. 
Without commitment on the government’s part, the tax parameters that the firms expect 
the government to choose ex ante would simply correspond to what is optimal for the 
government to choose ex post. The timing of event is depicted as Figure 1. The 
government sets its policy at stage 1. At stage 2, the firms make investment in 
outsourcing. At stage 3, conditional on policy choices by the government and the 
outsourcing decisions by the firms, the labor union determines the wage for the low- 5
skilled workers. When deciding on its wage demand, the monopoly union of each 
industry takes into account how this affects the demand for labor by the firms. We 
assume that there are many industries, so that each labor union represents only a small 
fraction of the total labor force. At stage 4, firms decide on domestic employment. The 
high-skilled labor wage adjusts to equalize labor demand and labor supply.  
stage 1             stage 2             stage 3                               stage 4                                                            




policy            outsourcing     wage formation of      high-skilled labor 
* H  and              
decisions       decision M      low-skilled wage  L w   low-skilled labor demand 
* L  
                       and high-skilled labor supply                    
                                               and   high-skilled wage  H w  
   
                                     Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions 
 
The decisions at each stage are analyzed by using backward induction. There are 
high-skilled and low-skilled workers and we assume that high-skilled wage formation is 
determined by the equality of the high-skilled labor demand and labor supply and the 
low-skilled wage rate is determined by the labor union subject to labor demand.
2 This 
timing structure seems plausible as a starting point when the implementation of a 
production mode with outsourcing compared with domestic labor demand and wage 
formation requires irreversible investment concerning the establishment of a network of 
foreign supplies. Of course, the relative timing of wage formation and outsourcing 
would be different if the firms flexibly adjust their production mode, and decide 
whether to initiate foreign outsourcing after the domestic low-skilled wage is 
determined.
3  
                                                 
2    This has also been analyzed a little bit in Lingens and Waelde (2006), but they have abstracted from 
outsourcing issues.   
3  Skaksen (2004) has analyzed this case using a Cobb-Douglas production function applied only to a 
homogenous domestic labor force. Also Braun and Scheffel (2007) have developed a simple two-stage 
game between a monopoly union and a firm by assuming that the labor union sets wages before the 
firms decide on the degree of outsourcing. They have argued that under such flexible outsourcing the 
cost of outsourcing has an ambiguous effect on the wage set by the labor union.       6
III.  High-Skilled and Low-Skilled Labor Demand and the Wage     
Formation of High-Skilled Workers under Labor Taxation  
 
III.1. High-Skilled and Low-Skilled Labor Demand 
 
At the last stage, the firm decides on the high-skilled labor demand H  and the 
low-skilled labor demand L in order to maximize the profit function, taking the 
acquired amount of outsourcing, M , as given,  
 
     ) ( ~ ~ ) , , (
) , (
M g L w H w M L H F Max L H
L H
− − − = π 3 2 1                                            (1)                     
 
where each firm takes the gross wage for high-skilled labor,  ) 1 ( ~ s w w H H + = , the gross 
wage for low-skilled labor,  ) 1 ( ~ s w w L L + = , and the outsourced low-skilled labor input 
M as given, where s is the proportional payroll tax levied on the firm. Under 
outsourced production firms acquire the low-skilled labor input at the factor price c, 
which is lower than the wage of domestic low-skilled workers. In order to obtain M  
units of outsourced low-skilled labor input firms have to make irreversible investment 
2 5 . 0 ) ( cM M g = with  0 ) ( ' > = cM M g  and  0 ) ( ' ' > = c M g  into the establishment of 
networks of suppliers in the relevant low-wage country.  
We follow Koskela and Stenbacka (2007) by assuming a general and reasonable 




a a M L H M L H F
− + =
1 ) ( ) , , ( , where the parameters ρ  and a are assumed to 
satisfy:  1 0 < < ρ  and  1 0 < < a . The parameter  0 > γ  captures the productivity of the 
outsourced low-skilled labor input relative to the domestic low-skilled labor input. The 
marginal products of high-skilled  and low-skilled labor are 
a a
H M L aH Y F
− − − + =
1 1 1 ) ( γ ρ
ρ   and 
a a
L M L a H Y F
− − + − = ) )( 1 (
1 γ ρ
ρ , respectively, 
where 
a a M L H Y
− + =
1 ) ( γ . The outsourced low-skilled labor input affects the marginal 
products of the domestic high-skilled and low-skilled labor inputs as follows:   7
                   0 ) ( ) 1 (
1 1 2 > + − =
− − − a a
HM M L a aH Y F γ γ ρ
ρ                                               (2a)       
                  [ ] 0 ) 1 ( 1 ) ( ) 1 (
1 1 < − − + − − =
− − − a M L a H Y F
a a
LM ρ γ γ ρ
ρ .                                   (2b)                                 
 
Thus, for this production function the domestic high-skilled labor input and the 
outsourced low-skilled labor input are complements, whereas the low-skilled domestic 
labor input and the outsourced low-skilled labor input are substitutes in terms of the 
marginal product effects of outsourcing. Also one can calculate in the similar way that 
the domestic high-skilled and low-skilled labor are complements, i.e.  0 > HL F . Given 
both the outsourcing decision and the wages the first-order conditions characterizing 
the domestic high-skilled and low-skilled labor demands are  
     
     [] 0 ~ ) ( ) (
1 1 1 1 = − + + =
− − − −
H
a a a a
H w M L aH M L H γ γ ρ π
ρ                               (3a) 
 
      [] 0 ~ ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
1 1 = − + − + =
− − −
L
a a a a
L w M L H a M L H γ λ ρ π
ρ .                            (3b) 
 
These first-order conditions imply the following relationship between the high-skilled 
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Substituting (4) into (3b) gives (see Appendix A) the low-skilled labor demand, which 
can be expressed as follows 
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L  denotes the own 













H  denotes the 
cross wage elasticity of the low-skilled labor with respect to the high-skilled wage in  8
the absence of outsourcing
4. These elasticities are higher with weaker decreasing 
returns to scale. Higher own wage and cross wage will affect negatively the low-skilled 
labor demand. In the absence of outsourcing the payroll tax elasticity of the low-skilled 
labor is  1
1









s Ls . According to (5), a more extensive outsourcing 
activity will decrease the low-skilled labor demand. This feature is consistent with 
empirical evidence.
5  
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. These are in conformity with 
empirical evidence according to which higher outsourcing increases the wage elasticity 
of low-skilled labor demand.
6   
                                                 
4  In the presence of perfect substitutability between two types of labour inputs, i.e. between L  and  M , 
we would have  1 = γ , but it is important to mention that qualitative results are similar.  
5    For instance Diehl (1999) has presented empirical evidence from German manufacturing industries in 
support of this hypothesis. Moreover, Görg and Hanley (2005) have used plant-level data of the Irish 
electronic sector to empirically conclude that international outsourcing reduces plant-level labor 
demand.    
6 Senses (2006) has provided empirical evidence according to which a production mode with more 
outsourcing seems to increase the wage elasticity of labor demand. Also Slaughter (2001) and Hasan, 
Mitra and Ramaswamy (2007) have shown in terms of empirics that international trade has increased 
the wage elasticity of labor demand.  9
Moreover, the elasticity of low-skilled labor with respect to outsourcing is 






















ε ε ε . Differentiating this with 
respect to M  gives 
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so that higher outsourcing will increase the outsourcing elasticity of the low-skilled 
labor. Differentiating (6a) with respect to the payroll tax gives  
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according to which the payroll tax in the presence of outsourcing will have a positive 
effect on the wage elasticity of the low-skilled labor demand. Comparative statics are 
qualitative similar in terms of 
L
H ε ˆ  and 
L
M ε . Of course there is no wage elasticity effect 











. In the presence of 
outsourcing the payroll tax elasticity of the low-skilled labor, 
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ε  so that higher outsourcing raises this elasticity as well, i.e. 
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Finally, substituting the RHS of equation (5) into the relationship between the 
high-skilled and low-skilled labor presented in equation (4) gives the following optimal 
demand for the high-skilled labor   10
ε ε ε − − − +
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s Hs . These elasticities are also higher with weaker decreasing 
returns to scale, but unlike in the case with the low-skilled labor, both the own wage 
and cross wage labor demand elasticities, and the payroll tax elasticity for the high-
skilled labor are independent of outsourcing, while higher own wage, cross wage and 
payroll tax will affect negatively the high-skilled labor demand.  
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the domestic 
demand for labor in the presence of outsourcing as follows. 
 
Proposition 1 In the presence of outsourcing  
(a) the own wage elasticity, the cross wage elasticity and the outsourcing 
elasticity for the low-skilled labor demand depend positively on the 
amount of outsourcing, and they also depend positively on the payroll tax, 
whereas  
(b) the own wage elasticity, the cross wage elasticity and the outsourcing 
elasticity for the high-skilled labor demand are independent of the amount 
of outsourcing and the payroll tax. 
 
Proposition 1 reveals an asymmetry in how the demand for high-skilled and low-skilled 
labor react to the amount of outsourcing and the level of payroll taxes. An increase in 
outsourcing or payroll taxes would increase the own wage elasticity, the cross wage 
elasticity and the outsourcing elasticity for the low-skilled labor demand, while having 





III.2.   Wage Formation for High-Skilled Workers under Labor Taxation 
  
III.2.1 Optimal Labor Supply of High-Skilled Workers 
 
We assume that the market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage  H w  follows 
from the equality of the labor demand and the labor supply. First we derive labor 
supply and after that the wage formation from market equilibrium by taking the low-
skilled wage  L w  as given.              
We assume that the government can employ the proportional wage tax  H t  for 
high-skilled workers, which is levied on the wage rate  H w  minus tax exemption  H e . 
Thus the total tax base is  H e w H H ) ( − , where H  is labor supply. In the presence of 
positive tax exemption the marginal wage tax exceeds the average wage tax rate 
) / 1 ( H H H w e t −  so that the system is linearly progressive.
7 The net-of-tax wage that the 
high-skilled worker receives is  H H H H H e t w t w + − = ) 1 ( ˆ . 
We assume that the labor supply of the high-skilled worker is determined by 
utility maximization. In the case of the Cobb-Douglas utility function the elasticity of 
substitution is equal to one in terms of consumption C  and leisure  H − 1 in the utility 
function, i.e. 
μ μ − − =
1 ) 1 ( ) , ( H C H C U ,  1 0 < < μ . Maximizing  
μ μ − − =
1 ) 1 ( ) , ( H C H C U  
s.t.  C H wH = ˆ  with respect to labor supply H  gives 
0 ) 1 ( ) ˆ )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ˆ (
1 1 = − − − − =
− − − μ μ μ μ μ μ H H w H H w U H H H  so that  
                      μ =
s H                                                                                              (11) 
Therefore under this assumption the net-of-tax wage  H H H H H e t w t w + − = ) 1 ( ˆ  will 
have no effect on labor supply when the substitution and income effects of wage rate 
cancel each other. It is important to emphasize that a central finding in the empirical 
labor market literature is that labor supply tends to be quite unresponsive along the 
intensive margin (see for empirical evidence, e.g. Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner and Saez 
                                                 
7   For a seminal paper about tax progression, see Musgrave and Thin (1948), and for another elaboration, 
see e.g. Lambert (2001, chapters 7-8).      12
(2007) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)). Therefore, we focus on this finding 
concerning the market equilibrium of high-skilled workers. 
 
 III.2.2 Market Equilibrium for High-Skilled Wage Formation   
 
Unlike in the case of low-skilled workers we assume that the high-skilled wage 
H w  is determined by the market equilibrium concerning the equality of the labour 
demand function and the labor supply function. In the case of Cobb-Douglas utility 
function the equality 
s H H =
*  gives  μ
ε
ε
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where  0
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ε ε . The comparative statics 
in terms of  L w  is   
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.             (13) 
 
Equation (13) lies in conformity with empirics concerning the negative relationship 
between high-skilled and low-skilled wages. It has been empirically shown that higher 
outsourcing will decrease wage formation of low-skilled workers and increase wage 
formation of high-skilled workers, i.e. that wage dispersion will increase.
8  
The effect of payroll tax on the wage rate of high-skilled workers is under our 
utility assumption   
     
                                                 
8      See evidence from various countries which lies in conformity with this, e.g. Braun and Scheffel 
(2007), Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 2001), Hijzen, Görg and Hine (2005), Hijzen (2007), Egger and 
Egger (2006), Munch and Skaksen (2005), Yan (2006), Riley and Young (2007) and Geishecker and 
Görg (2008).  13
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               (14)                        
     
so that higher payroll tax will decrease the wage rate of high-skilled workers because it 
decreases labor demand (concerning empirical evidence, see. e.g. Daveri and Tabellini 
(2000), and Bingley and Lanot (2002)).    
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the high-skilled 
wage determination in the presence of outsourcing as follows. 
 
Proposition 2 In the presence of outsourcing   
(a) the high-skilled wage depends negatively  on the low-skilled wage and  the 
payroll tax, whereas  
(b)  the high-skilled wage is independent of the high-skilled wage tax 
parameters in the case of high-skilled workers’ Cobb-Douglas utility 
function.   
 
In the first sight, it may appear surprising that the high-skilled wage reacts negatively to 
the low-skilled wage tax, but is independent of the high-skilled wage tax rate. The 
intuition for this relies on our assumption that the high-skilled workers have a Cobb-
Douglas utility function. With it, income and substitution effects of a tax increase on 
the labor supply cancel each other out. 
 
 
IV. Wage Formation by Monopoly Labor Union for Low-Skilled 
Workers under Labor Taxation 
 
Now we analyze the wage formation of low-skilled workers and continue to 
consider the acquired amount of  outsourcing,  M  as given. We analyze the wage 
formation by the monopoly union (see also Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), p. 401-403 
concerning the monopoly union specification), which determines the wage for low- 14
skilled workers in anticipation of optimal in-house low-skilled labor demand and of 
market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage  H w .
9   
 
IV.1. Wage Formation by the Monopoly Labor Union 
 
We investigate the wage formation by monopoly labor union when there is 
proportional payroll tax, and the linearly progressive wage tax for low-skilled workers. 
The market equilibrium for the high-skilled wage  H w  follows from the equality of 
labor demand and the labor supply by focusing on the case of Cobb-Douglas utility 
function. The monopoly labor union determines the wage for low-skilled workers in 
anticipation of optimal in-house employment decisions by the firm. We assume that the 
government can employ a proportional tax rate  L t , which is levied on the wage rate  L w  
minus a tax exemption e. Thus the total tax base is 
* ) ( L e wL− . In the presence of a 
positive tax exemption the marginal wage tax exceeds the average wage tax rate 
) / 1 ( L L w e t −  so that the system is linearly progressive. The net-of-tax wage is 
e t w t w L L L L + − = ) 1 ( ˆ .  
  The objective function of the labor union is assumed to be 
N b L b w N b L b e t w t V L L L L L L L L + − = + − + − =
* * ) ˆ ( ) ) 1 (( , where  L b  is the (exogenous) 
outside option available to the low-skilled workers and  N is the number of labor union 
members. Given the amount of outsourcing, the monopoly labor union sets wage for the 
low-skilled workers so as to maximize the surplus according to  
 





) ˆ ( max    s.t.    0 = L π  and 
s H H =
*                                (15)                        
                                                 
9  In Western European countries, which are our focus, labor market institutions are close to this (see e.g. 
Freeman (2008).  
  15
where 
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  (see equations (10), (11) and (12)).  
The first-order condition associated with (15) is  
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This can be written as follows   
 
























































ε ε . These wage elasticities are not 
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*  
depends negatively on the following variables: the high-skilled wage, the low-skilled 
wage, outsourcing, the productivity of the outsourced low-skilled labor input relative to 
the domestic low-skilled labor input, and the payroll tax.  Equation (17)  can be 
expressed as follows   
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ˆ .  Therefore we have (see Appendix B)  
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where the total wage elasticity allowing for the relationship between high-skilled and 
low-skilled wages is  1 ) 1 ( * > + =
L
M L
L γ β ε , 





β . It is important to 
emphasize that the optimal low-skilled wage (19) even for the monopoly labor union is 












 depends on the low-skilled wage rate in a non-linear way. It 
cannot be solved explicitly for the optimal domestic low-skilled wage.  
 
IV.2. Comparative Statics of Wage Formation  
 
In order to characterize the effect of outsourcing on the low-skilled wage 
formation we therefore apply the implicit differentiation. Differentiating the wage 
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ε
 the relationship between the low-skilled 
wage formation and outsourcing  can be written as follows 
        0

































                         (21)  17
so that higher outsourcing will decrease the wage of low-skilled workers. This lies in 
conformity with empirics.  
Differentiating the implicit wage formation (19) with respect to the productivity 
of the outsourced low-skilled labor input relative to the domestic low-skilled labor 
input and low-skilled wage formation gives 
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and can be expressed by using   0 ) 1 ( * * * 2 *
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.                         (23) 
 
Higher productivity of the outsourced low-skilled labor input relative to the domestic 
low-skilled labor input will have a wage moderating effect concerning low-skilled 
workers’ wage. Moreover, and importantly, equations (21) and (23) jointly with 








dwH  so that higher outsourcing and higher 
productivity of the outsourced low-skilled labor input will have positive effects on the 
domestic high-skilled labor wage.   
In terms of comparative statics of wage tax, tax exemption and outside option we 
have (see Appendix B) 
0
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
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According to (24a-24c) the effects of wage tax, tax exemption and outside option on 
low-skilled wage formation are qualitatively the same with and without outsourcing 
because  0




















































. Of course, in the absence of outsourcing the mark-up 













 is higher than 
in the presence of outsourcing. Therefore the effects of wage tax, tax exemption and 
outside option for unemployment benefit are smaller in the presence of international 




















Finally, differentiating the implicit wage formation (19) with respect to the wage 



















































































,              (25) 
which can be expressed as follows 
                                                                                                                                                                            19
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. Therefore, the payroll tax will 
have a wage moderating effect concerning the low-skilled workers’ wage, because the 
payroll tax will have a positive effect on the wage elasticity. But in the absence of 











The total effect of the payroll tax on the high-skilled workers’ wage is the 
following 
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and using equations (13), (14) and (26) this can be expressed as  
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which is also negative because  0 ) ) 1 (( ) 1 (




L γ ε ε β β , where 












L βε βε ε ε ε ε β .  
We can now summarize our findings in terms of the low-skilled wage formation 
in the presence of outsourcing as follows. 
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Proposition 3 In the presence of outsourcing 
(a)   the higher level of outsourced production and the higher productivity of 
outsourced production will decrease the wage for the low-skilled labor  
and increase the wage for the high-skilled labor, thereby inducing higher  
wage dispersion, and     
(b) the higher low-skilled wage tax will increase the wage for the low-skilled 
labor and decrease the wage for high-skilled labor and the higher low-
skilled wage tax exemption will decrease the wage for the low-skilled 
labor and will increase the wage for the high-skilled labor, and these 
qualitative results are also similar but larger  in the absence of 
outsourcing, and  
(c) the higher payroll tax for the firms will decrease the wage for the low-
skilled and high-skilled labor. In the absence of outsourcing, the higher 
payroll tax for the firms will decrease the wage for the high-skilled labor, 
but has no effect on the wage of low-skilled labor. 
     
The first part of Proposition 3 reveals political economy considerations related to 
outsourcing and taxation. An increased outsourcing benefits high-skilled workers, but 
hurts low-skilled workers. Such a result is perfectly in line with the fact that the 
outsourced input is a substitute to the low-skilled labor, and a complement to high-
skilled labor. Nonetheless, the conventional analysis has focused on competitive labor 
markets. 
The second part of Proposition 3 reports that the qualitative effects of wage taxes 
and tax exemption for the low-skilled workers are not changed by outsourcing. A 
higher wage tax for the low-skilled labor will encourage labor unions to increase their 
wage demand, which pushes for higher low-skilled unemployment and lower high-
skilled wages. A higher tax exemption for the low-skilled, on the other hand, reduces 
the wage demand by the labor union. This results in a lower unemployment for the low-
skilled, and increases the wages for the high-skilled. 
The third part of Proposition 3 reveals that outsourcing may change qualitatively 
how wage demands by labor unions respond to payroll taxes. In the absence of  21
outsourcing, a higher payroll tax has no effect on the wage of low-skilled labor that the 
labor unions set. With outsourcing, labor unions cut their wage demand when the 
payroll tax is increased. The wage for the high-skilled is decreasing in the payroll tax 
rate, both with and without outsourcing. 
 
 
V.  Optimal Committed Outsourcing Before Wage Formation and 
Domestic Labor Demand  
 
We now turn to explore the stage, where the firm commits itself to the  
outsourcing activity M  prior to the determination of wages and domestic employment. 
We characterize how tax parameters affect the equilibrium production mode. It is 
assumed that the long-run production mode decision internalizes the effect of the share 
of outsourced production on the low-skilled wage and also on the high-skilled wage.   
The firm determines the magnitude of outsourcing so as to maximize its profit. It 
is assumed that the firm has rational expectations regarding the subsequent outcomes 
with respect to the high-skilled and low-skilled wage and employment so that the 
production mode internalizes the effects of the share of outsourced production on 
wages and employment. The production mode is determined by the following 
optimization problem in the presence of linearly progressive wage taxation and 
proportional payroll taxation  
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envelope theorem we get the following first-order condition for the optimal amount of  
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 (see equation 21) and  
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.       (31b) 
Hence, outsourcing has both direct and indirect effects. The direct effects of an increase 
in outsourcing are the direct marginal cost cM  and the direct marginal profit  M F . The 
indirect effects are that outsourcing decreases the wage cost of the domestic low-skilled 
labor, because these are substitutes, but increases the market equilibrium wage cost of 
domestic high-skilled labor, because these are complements. Therefore, according to 
(30) the presence of domestic labor market imperfection increases the returns from 
outsourcing because it has an aggregate wage-moderating effect, but also decreases the 
returns due to wage increase of high-skilled labor.
11  
The first-order condition (30) we can now re-express it in the following way (see 
Appendix C) 
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π                        (32) 
   
                                                 
10 Outsourcing does not have a direct effect on the high-skilled wage, but only via the effect of low-
skilled wage, see equation (12).  
11 This lies in conformity with empirics, see e.g. Braun and Scheffel (2007), Egger and Egger (2006), 
Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 2001), Hijzen, Görg and Hine (2005), Geishecker and Görg (2008), 
Hijzen (2007), and Munch and Skaksen (2005).   23
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Now we analyze the effects of wage tax, tax exemption, unemployment benefit as 
well as the effect of payroll tax on the optimal outsourcing. Using the notation 
X M L
L
L = + + − γ ε β β ) 1 ( ) 1 (
*  the second-order condition is 
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where  0 > Z  (see Appendix C). 
In terms of the wage tax rate  L t  the first-order condition (32) changes as  







































































− = , (34) can be written (see equation (24a) and Appendix C) 
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L γ ε β γ γ  Using (33) and 
(35) we have  
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In terms of tax exemption and higher unemployment benefit we will get in the similar 




















π  gives (see equation (24b) and Appendix C)                                                               24
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Therefore, both higher domestic low-skilled wage tax and higher unemployment benefit 
increase optimal outsourcing, while higher tax exemption, ceteris paribus, decreases 
optimal outsourcing, when we have also allowed the effects of these policy parameters 
via the wage of the high-skilled workers.  
In terms of payroll tax rate s the first-order condition (32) will change via 
different aspects in the following way: 
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which can be expressed as follows (see equations (C8) and (C9) in Appendix C)  
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By using the cross-derivative  Ms π  gives                                                                  
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L ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − > + β ε β . The sign of  J  is a priori ambiguous so that higher payroll tax has 
an ambiguous effect on optimal outsourcing.        
We can now summarize our findings in terms of optimal outsourcing as follows: 
 
Proposition 4 Optimal committed outsourcing will be affected by the policy 
parameters as follows 
(a)   the higher domestic low-skilled wage tax and the higher unemployment 
benefit increase optimal outsourcing, while the higher tax exemption, 
ceteris paribus, decreases optimal outsourcing, whereas     
(b) the higher payroll tax for the firms has an ambiguous effect on  optimal 
outsourcing.   
 
Proposition 4 reports that in the presence of outsourcing, higher marginal tax on the 
low-skilled workers tends to increase optimal outsourcing. The same holds for a higher 
unemployment benefit, while higher tax exemption on the low-skilled labor decreases 
outsourcing. The intuition for these results is the following: In the absence of a change 
in outsourcing, higher marginal tax rate, higher unemployment benefit, or lower tax 
exemption would each encourage the labor union to increase its wage demand. This 
would, in turn, increase the optimal level of outsourcing. Anticipating the policy 
response by the labor unions, firms increase the amount of outsourcing. If payroll tax 




                                                 
12 It is an important further topic to check via numerical simulations, when this effect is positive or 
negative and how it depends on the precise parameter values.  26
VI.  Determinants of Equilibrium Unemployment by Low-Skilled 
Workers 
 
VI.1. Outsourcing and Equilibrium Unemployment   
 
We now move on to explore the determinants of equilibrium unemployment of 
low-skilled workers in dual labor markets, when there is both unionized and 
competitive determination of wages in the home country. First we analyze the effect of 
outsourcing given labor tax parameters  and study the effects of labor taxation 
parameters on equilibrium unemployment both via wage and outsourcing changes. 
According to (19) the wage formation for low-skilled workers in industry i is of the 










ˆ  is in the presence of linearly progressive wage 














. This mark-up factor is, in 
principle, industry-specific. In a general equilibrium the term  L b  should be re-
interpreted as the endogenous outside option, which we specify as
13  
 
                L L L L b u w u b + − = ) 1 (                                                                            (41) 
 
where  L u is the unemployment rate,   L b  captures the unemployment benefit and   L w  
denotes the wage formation in all identical industries (see e.g. Nickell and Layard 
(1999), p. 3048-3049 for a further discussion). Assuming a constant benefit-
replacement ratio  1 / 0
* < = < L L w b q  so that by using (41) we have 
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 and  L L b A w ˆ * =  can be written as 
                                                 
13 This approach for endogenous outside option has been used also in a dynamic model by Koskela and 
von Thadden (2008).  27
* * * ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( L L L L L L w q Au e t w A w t − + − = −  and in this case the  equilibrium low-skilled 
unemployment can be presented 
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L L . Higher benefit-replacement ratio will increase 
equilibrium unemployment. According to (42) in the presence of a constant benefit-
replacement ratio 
* / L L w b q =  the impact of outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment 













in (42). In the presence of outsourcing the mark-up 























In terms of outsourcing we have   
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where  outsourcing will have both the direct negative effect and the indirect positive 
effect via the wage on the total mark-up, but the direct effect dominates as     
[]
0














































) ) 1 (











 and   
0













γ ε β β
γ
 (see equations (19) and (21)). Therefore by  28









duL  so that higher outsourcing also in 
the presence of progressive wage taxation and proportional payroll taxation will 
decrease equilibrium unemployment when the benefit-replacement ratio is fixed and 
less than one. We can now summarize this finding as 
 
Proposition 5 A production mode with a higher amount of outsourced 
production, ceteris paribus, will reduce equilibrium unemployment of low-
skilled workers both in the presence and in the absence of progressive wage 
taxation and proportional payroll taxation.   
 
Proposition 5 reports very importantly the negative relationship between outsourcing 
and equilibrium unemployment of low-skilled workers, i.e. only concerning the 
relationship between higher wage elasticity of low-skilled labor demand and 
outsourcing, which leads to wage moderation of low-skilled workers and thereby 
smaller unemployment. Of course if there would be wage rigidity, then higher 
outsourcing would increase unemployment due to a decrease in domestic low-skilled 
labor demand.  
  
VI.2. Labor Tax Instruments and Equilibrium Unemployment  
  
Next we analyze the effect of labor tax parameters on equilibrium unemployment 
of low-skilled workers. According to Proposition 4 a higher domestic low-skilled wage 
tax, a higher unemployment benefit and a lower wage tax exemption increase optimal 
outsourcing, while the effects of a payroll tax on optimal outsourcing are ambiguous.   
Following the time sequence of decisions, presented in Figure 1, the total wage 
effects of tax policy instruments consist both of the direct effects and of the indirect 
effects via the impact these instruments have on the strategic outsourcing decision of 
firms and thereby also on the wage rate.  The total effect of the wage tax is  29

























. The direct wage effect is positive, and the indirect effect via 
outsourcing is negative, because the wage tax makes outsourcing more attractive which 
lowers the benefit of the wage increase for the monopoly labor union. By using 
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                      (44)    
In what follows we assume that the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, which is 
a reasonable assumption. We make the same assumption also in the case of tax 
exemption e.   
By differentiating the mark-up of (42) in terms of wage tax  L t  which gives via 
*
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. Therefore by combining (45) 












 so that higher wage tax in the presence of 
outsourcing will have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium unemployment when the 
benefit-replacement ratio is fixed and less than one. This is because the total effect of 
higher wage tax on wage of low-skilled workers is negative and thereby increases the 
wage elasticity and lowers the mark-up because of lower labor demand and higher  30
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duL  so that higher tax exemption in the presence of outsourcing 
will also have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium unemployment. This is because the 
total effect of higher tax exemption on wage of low-skilled workers is positive and 
thereby decreases the wage elasticity and raises mark-up because of higher labor 
demand and lower outsourcing. But there is also the negative effect of tax exemption on 
G due to 0














L L .  
  Finally, by differentiating the mark-up of (42) in terms of payroll tax s gives 
 
                 ?
) (
) 1 (





















































































duL  so that higher payroll tax in the presence of outsourcing will have 
an ambiguous effect. It will decrease the low-skilled labor demand, but have an 
ambiguous indirect effect via higher outsourcing so that the mark-up effect is 
ambiguous.  
We can summarize our findings in terms of the effect of tax parameters as.  
 
Proposition 6 In the presence of outsourcing when the benefit-replacement 
ratio is fixed and less than one and concerning the assumption that the direct 
effects of tax parameters on wage formation dominate the indirect effect via 
outsourcing  
(a) the higher wage tax and the higher tax exemption will have an ambiguous 
effect on equilibrium unemployment, as well as    
(b) the higher payroll tax will also have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium 
unemployment because it will decrease the low-skilled labor demand but 
will have ambiguous effect on outsourcing.  
 
Ambiguity associated with workers’ taxation parameters is due to the facts that the total 
effect of higher wage tax (tax exemption) on wage of low-skilled workers is negative 
(positive) so that wage elasticity increases (decreases) and the mark-up lowers (raises), 
but there is also the positive (negative) direct effects of parameters. In the absence of 
outsourcing we have the different results:  0
) (








































. Therefore, the effects of tax 





 Corollary In the absence of outsourcing  
(a) the higher wage tax and the lower tax exemption will have a positive effect 
on equilibrium unemployment, while   
(b) the higher payroll tax will have no effect.  
 
VI.3. Higher Degree of Tax Progression and the Low-Skilled Labor Demand 
 
Finally, we analyze the effect of wage tax progression on wage formation by the 
low-skilled workers and labor demand. We assume that the tax reform will keep the 
relative tax burden per low-skilled worker constant, i.e. this means  






L = − .                                                                 (48) 
The government can raise the degree of tax progression when it increases  L t  and esuch 
that  0 = dR . Formally we have by using equations (36) and (37) 
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* ) 1 (  and dividing by  L dt  and substituting the RHS of (49) 
for  L dt de/  gives (see Appendix D) 
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so that a higher degree of tax progression, keeping the relative tax burden per worker 
constant, will decrease the low-skilled wage rate both in the presence and absence of 
outsourcing (when  0 = B ). Finally, we characterize the low-skilled employment effect 
of this tax reform. By raising tax progression according to (49) we have 
























* * ) 1 ( *  so that the first term indicates 
the effect on the wage rate on the low-skilled labor demand and the second term 
indicates the induced outsourcing. Dividing this by  L dt and substituting the RHS of (49) 
for  L dt de/  gives after calculations (see Appendix D) 




















L γ                                                (51) 
so that a higher degree of tax progression, keeping the relative tax burden per worker 
constant, will increase the low-skilled labor demand both in the presence and absence 
of outsourcing (when the second term is zero). 
We can now summarize our findings as follows. 
 
Proposition 7 In the presence of outsourcing raising the wage tax and the tax 
exemption to keep the relative tax burden per worker constant, this higher 
degree of tax progression will decrease the wage rate and increase labor 
demand of low-skilled workers. This also works in the absence of outsourcing.  
 
 
VII. Conclusions   
 
Most European countries are characterized by dual labor markets, in which wages 
of some workers are set by labor unions, while other wages are determined 
competitively. In this paper, we have studied how the presence of international 
outsourcing affects such an economy when the low-skilled workers are unionized, and 
the high-skilled workers are employed in competitive labor markets. We also examine  34
how wage taxation and the payroll tax affect outsourcing decisions and subsequent 
wage formation. 
We have shown that the own wage elasticity, the cross wage elasticity and the 
outsourcing elasticity for the low-skilled labor demand depend positively on the amount 
of outsourcing, and these also depend positively on the payroll tax. The own wage 
elasticity, the cross wage elasticity and the outsourcing elasticity for the high-skilled 
labor demand are independent of the amount of outsourcing and the payroll tax. In the 
presence of outsourcing the low-skilled wage rate set by the monopoly labor union 
depends positively on the low-skilled wage tax rate and the payroll tax rate and 
negatively on the tax exemption, whereas the high-skilled wage is independent of the 
high-skilled wage tax parameters. 
A higher level and productivity of outsourced production will decrease the wage 
for the low-skilled labor and increase the wage for the high-skilled labor, thereby 
inducing higher wage dispersion. A higher low-skilled wage tax will increase the wage 
for the low-skilled labor and a higher low-skilled wage tax exemption will decrease the 
wage for the low-skilled labor and increase the wage for the high-skilled labor. A 
higher payroll tax for the firms will decrease the wage for the low-skilled labor and also 
under reasonable assumptions decrease the wage for the high-skilled labor. A 
production mode with a higher amount of outsourced production, ceteris paribus, will 
reduce equilibrium unemployment of low-skilled workers. 
Optimal committed outsourcing will be affected by the policy parameters as 
follows: a higher domestic low-skilled wage tax and a higher unemployment benefit 
increase optimal outsourcing, while a higher tax exemption, ceteris paribus, decreases 
optimal outsourcing. A higher payroll tax for the firms has an ambiguous effect on 
optimal outsourcing. The effects of tax parameters on low-skilled unemployment are 
ambiguous, due to conflicting effects. In the absence of outsourcing, a higher wage tax 
and a lower tax exemption will increase low-skilled unemployment, while a higher 
payroll tax will have no effect. 
There are several new research topics associated with these issues. We have 
focused on the case where firms decide outsourcing before wage formation. But 
sometimes firms may be flexible to decide outsourcing activity after wage is set by the  35
labor union. Another important issue is to study empirically the implications of labor 
taxation and labor tax reforms on the level of outsourcing that the firms choose. Finally, 
we found that the effects of tax parameters were, in the presence of outsourcing, often 
ambiguous. Numerical analysis could be used to check the role of various parameters.   
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Appendix A: Optimal Low-Skilled Labor Demand 
 
Substituting the RHS of (4) for H  into (3b) gives   37
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(A3) in its turn gives (5). QED. 
 
Appendix B: Optimal Wage Setting under Progressive Wage Taxation 
and Proportional Payroll Taxation 
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so that  38
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Using (B2) and (B3) gives  0
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which gives (24a). Equations (24b) and (24c) can be derived in the similar way. QED. 
 
Appendix  C:  Optimal Committed Outsourcing Before Wage     
Formation and Domestic Labor Demand  
 
By  using  equations  (21)  and  (31b)  we  have                
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.                                       (C2)  
Incorporating (31a), (C1) and (C2) into the first-order condition (30) it can be 
expressed as  39
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Using equation (4) we have   ) (
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where       0
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Using (C5a) and (C5b) makes it possible to rewrite (C3) as equation (32).  
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Concerning equation (35) one term in its numerator can be expressed as follows 
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By using  M L X
L
Lγ ε β β ) 1 ( ) 1 (
* + + − = this can be written as 
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so that  0 >
L Mt π  as  0 > −e bL . 
Concerning the payroll tax by using equation (26) we can rewrite one term in (39) as 
follows  
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This gives (47). QED.  
 
Appendix D: Tax Progression and Low-Skilled Labor Demand    
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in (51) we obtain that it is negative, i.e. 




























                               (D2) 
where  0
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. The total labor demand effect 
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from (37) and (38) gives  
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